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Destitution Economies: Circuits of Value in
Asylum, Refugee, and Migration Control
Kate Coddington,

Deirdre Conlon,† and Lauren L. Martin‡

Geography and Planning Department, University at Albany, State University of New York
†School of Geography, University of Leeds
‡Department of Geography, Durham University
In this article, we argue that destitution economies of migration control are specific circuits of exchange and
value constituted by migration control practices that produce migrant and refugee destitution. Comparative
analysis of three case studies, including border encampment in Thailand, deprivation in U.S. immigration
detention centers, and deterrence through destitution in the United Kingdom, demonstrate that circuits of
value depend on the detachment of workers from citizenship and simultaneously produce both migrant
destitution and new forms of value production. Within destitution economies, migration and asylum’s
particular juridico-political position as domestic, foreign, and securitized allows legal regimes to produce
migrants and asylum seekers as distinct economic subjects: forsaken recipients of aid. Although they might
also work for pay, we argue that destitute migrants and asylum seekers have value for others through the
grinding labor of living in poverty. That is, in their categorization as migrants and asylum seekers, they
occupy a particular position in relation to economic circuits. These economic circuits of migration control, in
turn, rely on the destitution of mobile people. Our approach advances political geographies of migration,
bordering, and exclusion as well as economic geographies of marketization and value, arguing that the
predominance of political analysis and critique of immigration and asylum regimes obscures how those regimes
produce circuits of value in and through law, state practices, and exclusion. Furthermore, law, state power,
and forced mobility constitute circuits of value and marketization. Conceptualizing these migration control
practices as destitution economies illuminates novel transformations of the political and economic geographies
of migration, borders, and inequality. Key Words: borders, circuits, destitution, migration, poverty, value.
本文认为, 在因移民管制致贫的经济体中存在一个特殊的交换和价值循环, 其中的移民
管制措施就是造成移民和难民贫困的原因。作者对三个案例研究进行了比较分析：泰
国的边境难民营, 美国移民拘留中心内的物资匮乏以及英国的贫困所产生的严重负面影
响。比较结果显示, 价值循环是通过剥夺工人的公民身份实现的, 同时它也会产生移民
贫困和新价值的生成形式。在贫困经济体中, 移民和政治庇护寻求者在国内外以及安全
方面所具有的特殊司法政治地位, 让移民和寻求庇护者在法律体系中成为一个独特的经
济主体：被遗弃的援助接受者。尽管他们也可能工作并获得报酬, 但我们认为贫困的移
民和寻求庇护者为他人提供价值的方式, 就是在贫困中进行艰苦的工作。换言之, 他们
作为移民和寻求庇护者的身份, 让他们在经济循环中占据了特殊的地位。反之, 移民控
制的经济循环也依赖于流动人口的贫困。我们的分析方法进一步探讨了移民, 边境和
排斥的政治地理以及市场化和价值的经济地理, 我们认为占主导力量的政治分析和对
移民与庇护制度的批判, 掩盖了这些制度如何通过法律, 国家实践和排斥产生价值循
环。此外, 法律, 国家权力和强制流动构成了价值和市场化的循环。将这些移民控制
实践在概念上视为贫困经济, 显示出了在移民, 边界和不平等政治和经济地理方面出
现的新转型。关键词：边境, 循环, 贫困, 移民, 贫穷, 价值。
Sostenemos en este artıculo que las economıas miserrimas del control de migraciones son circuitos especıficos
de intercambio y valor constituidos por las practicas de control migratorio que generan miseria para
migrantes y refugiados. El analisis comparativo de tres estudios de caso, que incluyen la reclusion fronteriza
en campamento en Tailandia, las privaciones de los centros de detencion de inmigracion americanos y la
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polıtica de disuasion por la expectativa de miseria en el Reino Unido, demuestran que los circuitos de valor
dependen del desapego de los trabajadores a la ciudadanıa y simultaneamente producen tanto miseria del
migrante como nuevas formas de produccion de valor. Dentro de las economıas de la pobreza, la particular
posicion jurıdico-polıtica de la migracion y del asilo, que se asume como domestica, extranjera y objeto de
consideracion en terminos de seguridad nacional, permite regımenes legales que pueden catalogar a migrantes
y buscadores de asilo como distintos sujetos economicos: receptores desamparados de ayuda. Si bien podrıa
ocurrir que ellos trabajen por paga, arg€uimos que los migrantes pobres y los peticionarios de asilo tienen
valor para otros a traves de la agobiante brega de vivir en la pobreza. Esto es, en su categorizacion como
migrantes y buscadores de asilo, ellos ocupan una posicion particular en relacion con los circuitos
economicos. A su turno, estos circuitos economicos de control migratorio dependen de la miseria de la gente
movil. Nuestro enfoque avanza en las geografıas polıticas de la migracion, los asuntos fronterizos y la
exclusion, lo mismo que en las geografıas economicas del mercadizacion y el valor, arguyendo que el
predominio del analisis polıtico y crıtica de la inmigracion y los regımenes de asilo oculta el modo como esos
regımenes producen circuitos de valor en y a traves de la ley, las practicas estatales y la exclusion.
Adicionalmente, la ley, el poder del estado y la movilidad forzada constituyen circuitos de valor y la
economıa del libre mercado. Conceptualizar estas practicas de control migratorio como economıas de la
miseria ayuda a aclarar las transformaciones novedosas de las geografıas polıticas y economicas de migracion,
frontera y desigualdad. Palabras clave: circuitos, fronteras, migracion, miseria, pobreza, valor.
In this article, we argue that destitution hasbecome a technique of political exclusion andvaluation in migration control regimes and, more
specifically, that destitution economies exclude to
make migrants valuable to others in their exclusion
from political membership, work, and rights. By con-
necting recent literature on relational poverty,
changing political geographies of migration, and the
circuits of value produced by state control practices,
we contribute an original approach to emerging
trends in immigration, asylum, border policing, and
refugee resettlement. Transformations in global capi-
talism continue to produce creative mechanisms of
exclusion and forms of inequality, surplus popula-
tions (Gidwani and Reddy 2011), forms of abandon-
ment (Povinelli 2011), and expulsions (Sassen 2014)
now visible in the wake of these changes. Although
precarity is endemic to contemporary global capital-
ism (Mahmud 2014), migrants’ sociolegal status(es)
generate particularly precarious material formations
(Lewis et al. 2015) and conditions of unfree labor in
detention (Bales and Mayblin 2018). Taking three
different cases in turn, we argue that immigration
and asylum regimes rely on a multiplicity of eco-
nomic relationships that are more deeply rooted and
entangled than previous studies of political econo-
mies of migration control, detention, and borders
have explored. As our case studies show, destitution
has become an important enforcement tool that
reworks the actually existing circuits of value in asy-
lum markets—and how we understand value and cir-
culation more broadly.
In this article, we argue that destitution econo-
mies of migration control are specific circuits of
exchange and value constituted by migration
control practices that produce migrant and refugee
destitution. As we go on to show in our three case
studies, destitution economies of migration control
hinge on spatial practices of containment, mobility,
and legal categorization that produce destitution’s
dependence, vulnerability, and impoverishment.
Although migrants and refugees1 are economic
actors in their own right, we emphasize the econo-
mies emerging around public–private arrangements
of care and control. These economies do not, we
contend, operate according to the same neoliberal
market logics that govern social service privatiza-
tion, nor do they presume citizen-worker subjects
like national economies do (Mezzadra and Neilson
2013). Our case studies show, rather, that refugees
and migrants become valuable in their enclosure,
dependence, and vulnerability, precisely not in their
self-sufficiency, resilience, and entrepreneurship. More
to the point, migrants’ and refugees’ sociolegal status
makes them valuable as rightless, detainable, and
excludable. We argue that migration and asylum’s
particular juridico-political position as domestic,
foreign, and securitized allows legal regimes to
produce migrants and asylum seekers as distinct
economic subjects: destitute recipients of aid.
Although they might also work for pay, we assert
that destitute migrants and asylum seekers produce
value for others through the grinding labor of living
in poverty. That is, in their categorization as
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migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, they occupy
a particular position in relation to economic cir-
cuits. These economic circuits of migration control,
in turn, rely on the destitution of mobile people.
The article first draws on recent research on rela-
tional poverty and (hyper)precarity to situate our
approach to destitution. We argue that destitution
implies not only impoverishment but also an
enforced dependence on others for the means of
survival. Next, we present our conceptualization of
destitution economies of migration control to
explain how migrants’ legal othering, impoverish-
ment, and dependence become valuable to a range
of actors. After discussing our comparative meth-
odology, we trace the circuits of value that pro-
duce destitution economies in three distinct
contexts: special economic zones adjacent to Thai
refugee camps, dispossessions experienced in the
U.S. detention and deportation system, and cash-
less support for refused asylum seekers in the
United Kingdom. We close by discussing how
migration control’s destitution economies push
geographers to think differently about how econo-
mies are composed through the political geogra-
phies of migration, poverty, and borders.
Literature Review
Destitution
In this article, we understand destitution to refer to
a material and discursive configuration that is consti-
tuted of extreme impoverishment and dependency on
others for the means of survival. Our framing of desti-
tution is related to both emerging work on relational
poverty and expanded notions of precarity. We main-
tain that destitution is best understood as relational,
as Elwood, Lawson, and Sheppard (2017) framed geo-
graphical studies of poverty: For them, raced, classed,
and gendered difference constitute the framing of
poverty as a problem, its possible range of solutions,
and how the success of solutions gets measured.
Elwood, Lawson, and Sheppard (2017) approached
poverty not as a fixed thing happening in a discrete
space and time but rather as produced through mate-
rial and discursive configurations that operate simul-
taneously at multiple spaces and times in and beyond
territorially bounded spaces. For us, a comparative
approach is necessary to highlight the production of
destitution economies as similarly variable, yet
related, configurations at multiple scales, times, and
“sociospatial expressions” (Elwood, Lawson, and
Sheppard 2017, 751). Although destitution might
adopt a similar relational conceptualization and might
fall under the wider umbrella of studies of poverty,
we maintain that destitution and poverty are not
identical. Many define destitution as a “state of
poverty” (e.g., Gopinath 2014, 342), but for us desti-
tution involves a state of not simply impoverishment
but also dependence—a poverty so extreme that not
only do people lack the means to provide for them-
selves but others must provide for them. Here, we
understand destitution as the forsaking of migrants as
economic subjects, the idea of a deprivation so funda-
mental that it can only be survived through depen-
dence on others. As we go on to argue, this
dependence takes a particular form for refugees, asylum
seekers, and migrants excluded from (legal) employ-
ment and reliant on humanitarian organizations and
state agencies for survival. These relations of depen-
dence reduce migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to
biological reproduction and need, limiting their politi-
cal subjectivity to victims and aid recipients.
These relations of dependence share striking simi-
larities with forms of vulnerability and exploitation
explored in a growing body of scholarship on precar-
ity. Precarity emerged from discussions within labor
studies about emerging groups of workers who faced
“conditions of vulnerability relative to contingency
and the inability to predict” (Ettlinger 2007, 320).
More recently, geographers have explored spatial
approaches that draw on Butler’s (2009) understand-
ing of precarity as being unevenly distributed, differ-
ential exposure to violence (Lewis et al. 2015; Waite
and Lewis 2017). Dependency becomes a key way in
which conditions of poverty, injustice, and vulnera-
bility linked through conceptualizations of precarity
are perpetuated: As Harker (2012) wrote, “The ways
in which one’s life is dependent on the lives of oth-
ers” (859) are foundational to precarity. Moving
beyond an explicit focus on labor has also allowed
geographers to concretely link precarity with sociole-
gal status (Lewis et al. 2015; Burridge and Gill
2017). This approach is key to understanding law’s
vital role in producing destitution via the malleabil-
ity or selective appropriation of legal categories by
what Coutin et al. (2017) termed the “discretionary
state.” In our conceptualization, destitution involves
not only a state of dependence and legally produced
vulnerability but also extreme impoverishment.
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We use the term destitution rather than poverty or
precarity because the term signifies a connection
between extreme impoverishment and dependency
on others. Destitute migrants face different sets of
risks than do other impoverished populations (Bloch
2014) and face expectations of behaving as eventual
citizens even as they are stripped of the ability to do
so. Enforced destitution in the UK context has been
framed as contrary to the UN Refugee Convention’s
promise of economic and social rights and as a wider
international human rights issue of concern
(Cholewinski 1998). The way in which destitution
has become fixed to a specific legal meaning in the
UK context is unlike how it is defined or approached
in other areas of the world, but it is similar to our use
of the term: In the United Kingdom, being destitute
means extreme impoverishment that requires depen-
dency on state or charities’ assistance. Our third case
study explores this juridical–institutional context to
understand how the legal codification of destitution
enables the revaluation of refused asylum seekers as
data producers and performative deterrence. Like
Gopinath (2014), we argue that beyond the United
Kingdom, destitution has the advantage of being a
term that is rarely institutionalized. Furthermore, its
flexibility across variable sociospatial arrangements
and temporal or spatial scales best articulates the
mode of governance we explore here.
Destitution Economies
Migration has long been governed through state
economies, particularly through labor market policies.
Political economies of migration are a well-established
field, covering macroeconomic analyses of migration’s
contributions to national and local tax revenue, labor
market shortages, and investment (e.g., Fitzgerald,
Leblang, and Teets 2014). The field of migration and
migration as development similarly tracks the relation-
ship between migration, remittances, and changes in
sending societies (e.g., Gamlen 2014). Sociologists and
anthropologists have long documented migrants’ eco-
nomic practices, particularly where migrants are not
granted access to banks and financial products.
Lending and remittances are organized in many differ-
ent ways, with greater and lesser visibility to states,
depending on histories of migration, settlement, and
enduring translocal relationships (Cross 2015). Islamic
finance has received growing attention, as migrant
workers use non-interest-bearing institutions to transfer
money (Pollard and Samers 2013). Migration itself is
often presumed to be an economic practice, and politi-
cal framings of migration frequently move between
“deserving” hard-working, tax-paying migrants and
“undeserving,” migrants who either work too much
(stealing jobs) or too little (abusing public benefits).
There is a burgeoning interdisciplinary field inter-
rogating economies of migration control and a litany
of neologisms describing these economies: the migra-
tion industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen
2013), immigration industrial complex (Fernandes
2007), illegality industry (Andersson 2014), and
detention rights industry (Morris 2017). Each
implies a different conceptualization of economy as
well, creating a great deal of ambiguity about
whether industries and economies are metaphorical
or material (Martin 2017). Recent work on the inti-
mate economies of detention, however, shows how
detention produces migrants’ deprivation by under
feeding and irregularly feeding detained migrants and
failing to provide them with sufficient clothing and
hygiene products (Hiemstra and Conlon 2017).
Destitute migrants then work for $1 to $2 per day to
buy overpriced commissary items and phone calls to
loved ones, laboring in a cycle of accumulation by
dispossession. This highly exploitative structure of
waged work is only possible for detained noncitizens,
who are not full rights-bearing subjects in U.S. con-
stitutional and immigration law. Similarly, Bales and
Mayblin (2018) argued that detainee labor sits on a
continuum of “unfree labor.” Immigration status and
spatial practices of enclosure produce particular kinds
of laboring subjects, embedding them in regimes of
value specific to immigration control. The focus has
largely been on macroeconomic industry-level analy-
ses of for-profit contractors (Golash-Boza 2009), lob-
bying expenditures (Doty and Wheatley 2013;
Carson and Diaz 2015), and profits and government
expenditures. Extending work on intimate economies
of migrant detention, this article builds on scholar-
ship exploring the political dimensions of immigra-
tion and asylum regimes and brings an explicit
conceptualization of the economic relationships sus-
taining these regimes. This article focuses, therefore,
on the circuits of value necessary for—and produced
through—spatial practices of encampment, disposses-
sion, detention, and deterrence.
We understand economies as circuits of value pro-
duced through social, political, and calculative prac-
tices and laboring bodies. Broadly, we are inspired by
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recent work on biocapital and lively commodities
that interrogate the specific ways in which new com-
modities and new forms of labor are rendered, mea-
sured, valued, financed, and circulated (Rajan 2006;
Cooper 2008; Cooper and Waldby 2014). Scholarship
on lively commodities takes account of the moment
when new commodities enter into a process of valua-
tion, where they become envisioned as sources of sur-
plus, exchange, affect, circulation, or possibility
(Barua 2019). Value does not necessarily mean price,
or profit, as we detail throughout this article.
Furthermore, analyses of new commodities and
moments of valuation have pointed to the crucial
role of the state and laws in constituting commodifi-
able biological material. National immigration laws
are also foundational to destitution economies as
immigration categories render mobile people as desti-
tute, unemployable, and excludable in highly particu-
lar ways. Although the specific operations and
relations of bioeconomies do not map directly onto
destitution economies, the analytic methods employed
in this literature resonate with broader interrogations
of diverse economies (Gibson-Graham 2014). This
scholarship emphasizes how capitalist economies func-
tion in different ways—and that not all economies
are capitalist. In addition, this research demonstrates
that social and political difference shape how seem-
ingly independent economic processes unfold. As
Gilmore (2007) argued, racial formations are very
much produced in place, so that urban and regional
economic development refract specific racialized, gen-
dered, and ethnic inequalities. Migrant and refugee
politics are infused with racial stereotypes and essen-
tialized notions of ethnic identity, as well as colonial
hierarchies informing preferred migrants and presump-
tions of nonintegration (Mayblin 2017). As Wright
(2004) argued, migrants’ disposability emerges from
an interplay between gendered hierarchies and gen-
dered divisions of labor on the U.S.–Mexico border.
Our three case studies exemplify how social differ-
ence, legal categories, and destitution come together
to make migrants and refugees valuable to contractors
and states in specific ways. These economies require,
we argue, destitution. Moreover, as we noted earlier,
the durability of these economic relationships will
impede rights-based immigrant and refugee rights
movements, challenging advocates to think differently
about the possibilities of activism.
We propose that the concept of destitution econ-
omies captures how monetary exchange, transaction
data, and labor produce value from migrants’ depen-
dence and impoverishment. Although research on
the governmentalities of migration control has iden-
tified rationalities of control (Walters 2006;
Coddington 2017), care (Martin 2012; Pallister-
Wilkins 2015), sovereign territoriality (Mountz
2011), and risk (Neal 2009), this work has not con-
ceptualized how economic relationships condition
and (re)produce these governmentalities. Instead,
economic relationships are presumed to operate
according to profit-oriented logics distinct from the
legal, juridical, and political constitution of mobile
subjects. Drawing on the substantial literature
exploring neoliberal governmentality, we understand
economic rationalities to be modes of governance
and subjectification that operate in and through
state power, rather than distinct from it (Larner
2003; Langley 2006). Significantly, our case studies
cannot be explained easily by neoliberal rationalities:
Refused asylum seekers in the United Kingdom are
made valuable in their unproductivity, and deter-
rence practices bar their participation in neoliberal
subjectivity; refugee camps’ territorial and legal
exceptionalism is made economically viable to solve
their political intractability; and migrant detention
and deportation dispossess migrants of their belong-
ings and savings, hitching care and control to
broader circuits of value. These microeconomies of
mobility management (Conlon and Hiemstra 2017b)
require sensitivity to place-specific conditions. For
this reason, we understand economies to be multiple,
localized, and highly contingent (Gibson-Graham
2014; Lai 2016; Langley and Leyshon 2017) rather
than global logics, systems, or industries. In fact, it is
precisely because immigration, asylum, and refugee
laws are highly context specific that destitution
economies of migration control take such different
forms. Our three case studies show how destitution
economies embed legal othering, dependence, and
impoverishment in broader circuits of value, impli-
cating actors, relationships, and places less visibly
associated with carceral geographies of migration
control.
We argue that immigration and asylum regula-
tions not only have created forms of value, calcula-
tive practices, and circuits but have incorporated
financial dependence and exploitation into state
mobility control practices. Economic relations are
not derivative of—or secondary to—political prac-
tices of categorization, detention, and deportation:
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Cashlessness, encamped labor, and dispossession
are techniques of political expulsion aimed at regu-
lating admission to political life. Destitution is a pro-
cess of impoverishment and enforced dependency
that has become particularly important to immigra-
tion and asylum regimes. In other words, migration
control practices organize circuits of value in
ways that produce and enforce migrants’, asylum
seekers’, and refugees’ official dependence on state
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) resources.
Unofficially, of course, people develop other valuation
practices, circuits of exchange and mobility, work,
and labor that escape state control. Our aim in this
article is to problematize the predominance of politi-
cal analysis and critique of immigration and asylum
regimes and to show how these regimes are producing
circuits of value in and through law, state practices,
and exclusion. Foregrounding specific entanglements
of economic and political exclusion, we elaborate our
approach through three case studies where law, state
power, forced mobility, and destitution constitute cir-
cuits of value.
Method
To trace destitution economies, we compare three
case studies, focusing on the circuits of value at
work in each. In this article, our concern is how
economies come into being through the practices
that produce migrant destitution; that is, how pro-
cesses of strategic deprivation are part of larger cir-
cuits of value. Comparative analysis draws on Le
Espiritu’s (2014) methodology of “critical
juxtaposition,” the “bringing together of seemingly
different or disconnected events, communities, histo-
ries and spaces” (21) to better understand the multi-
ple ways in which migrant destitution is made
valuable to others. Recognizing the tendency of
some comparative projects to homogenize difference,
we argue that the political possibilities of making
connections and highlighting relationships are many
(Kar and Schuster 2016). Our analysis allows us to
identify topologies of migrant destitution, common
patterns of destitution, dependence, and disposses-
sion materialized through localized practices. Because
the field of migration governance is defined and cod-
ified through international human rights regimes and
by international actors, theorizing locally specific yet
common destitution economies of migration control
provides fresh potential to challenge new forms of
state violence and exclusion.
Migration governance in the United Kingdom,
United States, and Thailand shares many similari-
ties: a focus on ad hoc and arbitrary policies toward
migrants (Coddington 2018), the expanding role of
private contractors in immigration enforcement prac-
tices (Flynn and Cannon 2009; Conlon and
Hiemstra 2017a; Martin 2017), the shrinking of
global aid budgets affecting support for refugees and
migrants, and the increasingly xenophobic rhetoric
targeting refugees and migrants across the world. Yet
our comparison highlights that in the United
Kingdom, United States, and Thailand, migrant des-
titution is embedded within strategies to limit oppor-
tunities for protection for refugees even as
destitution becomes enmeshed within circuits of
value creation. To compare, Stoler (2016) wrote, “is
a situated political act of discernment” (15). Thus,
our comparative analysis elucidates how, in distinct
geographical settings, detaching people from citizen-
ship produces forms of hyperalienation and exploita-
tion that are linked to disparate yet related
practices, structures, and logics that create—and
benefit from—the deprivation of migrant and refugee
populations in different parts of the world. Our
approach allows us to map a “counter-topography”
(Katz 2001) between distant places, to show the
multiple ways in which destitution becomes valuable
in migration control regimes. Focusing on one site
would risk particularizing the phenomenon, locating
cause and effect in local practices. Instead, our com-
parative approach shows how “engagements with
global imperatives are the material forms and practi-
ces of situated knowledges” (Katz 2001, 1214). This
methodological approach enables a politics of geo-
graphical knowledge production that is both situated
and capable of speaking to global trends and to pos-
sibilities for migrant solidarity.
Throughout this article, we use the term migrant
as a broad term to refer to mobile people, refugees,
and asylum seekers where the discussion does not
require legal specificity. We retain refugees and asy-
lum seekers where these legal categories actively con-
figure the context under consideration. We take this
approach to acknowledge and challenge methodolog-
ical nationalism in migration research, which both
treats categories as definitive populations and takes
state categories for granted as legitimate definitions
of populations (Crawley and Skleparis 2018).
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Accepting state categorizations in research presumes
them to be analytically and theoretically viable,
which is problematic for two reasons. First, it pre-
sumes that these categories adequately describe a
population, when a volume of research documents
their inadequacy for capturing nuanced migration
journeys, the continual change in legal application
of these categories, and migrants’ agency about how
and when they occupy categories. Second, accepting
state categorizations of mobile people also accepts
the definition of migration as a problem for states.
In contrast, we begin from the position that the
problem(s) of migration, asylum, detention, encamp-
ment, and destitution discussed in this article emerge
from particular approaches to territoriality and the
securitization, bordering, criminalization, and exclu-
sion that have resulted from them.
Each case study relies on qualitative methods;
nonetheless, different national contexts necessitate
different methods. Document analysis supports analy-
sis in the United Kingdom and the United States,
whereas in Thailand, language barriers and govern-
ment secrecy make interviews a preferred option.
The Thai case study is based on two months of field
research undertaken in Bangkok and Chiang Mai,
Thailand, in 2015 based at the Asian Research
Center for Migration at Chulalongkorn University.
Kate Coddington conducted more than thirty semi-
structured interviews with individuals including Thai
immigration policymakers, members of Thai and
international migration NGOs, and scholars studying
regional migration issues (in English) focused on
Thai and regional refugee protection practices. She
was restricted to interviewing members of NGOs
(mostly non-Thai) and policymakers (mostly Thai)
by the terms of her agreement with the Thai govern-
ment as part of receiving a research visa, which for-
bade her from working directly with migrants
themselves. Her fieldwork took place before and
after the 17 August 2015 Erawan Shrine bombings
in Bangkok, an event that the Thai government
attributed to its recent refoulement of asylum seekers
to China. Given this context, nearly all identifying
information of respondents is retracted to allow for
their candidness. The interviews are supplemented
by secondary source material documenting the even-
tual construction of the special economic zones in
late 2015 after Coddington left Thailand.
The U.S. case study draws on ongoing research
with Nancy Hiemstra (Conlon and Hiemstra 2014,
2017a, 2017b) that examines the infrastructure and
economies of U.S. immigration detention.
Collaborating since 2013, Hiemstra and Conlon
have examined documents linked to the day-to-day
operation of detention facilities in the greater New
York/New Jersey area. Using Freedom of Information
Act requests as well as state public records requests,
Conlon and Hiemstra have amassed facility hand-
books, commissary price lists, daily activity schedules,
and subcontract agreements for services, including
food provision, medical care, telecommunications,
and laundry services, among other operations, for an
array of facilities, including federally operated (by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) centers,
state and local jails that house migrant detainees,
and privately contracted facilities. Conlon and
Hiemstra have also interviewed fifteen people,
including lawyers, advocates, volunteer visitors, and
a former detainee, who, through their various inter-
actions with facilities, are knowledgeable about how
detention centers function. Here, Conlon also draws
on research and published reports on the deportation
system (Martinez and Slack 2013; Ewing and Cantor
2016) to illustrate where and how dependency is
produced and value extracted through accumulated
dispossessions for migrants who are caught up in the
U.S. detention and deportation regime.
The UK cashless debit card case study is based on
similar methods, including site visits, collection of
reports from NGOs, parliamentary reports and testi-
monies, Web sites and blog posts discussing cashless
debit cards, and news media. Interviews are not
included here because they were collected informally
and, given the relatively small number of recipients
near Durham University, risk revealing identifying
information. The research was carried out from 2016
to 2018, a period that included the expansion of
debit cards from refused asylum seekers to all asylum
seekers and a change in service provider. This signifi-
cantly broadened the number of organizations and
asylum seekers receiving card-based benefits. Refused
asylum seekers still cannot withdraw cash from ATMs
with the card, however, whereas predecision asylum
seekers can withdraw cash to spend how they choose.
In each case, we explore different circuits of
value, which include the waged and reproductive
labor of migrants themselves; practices of subjectifi-
cation, categorization, and territorialization; calcula-
tions of potential productivity; expertise; and, of
course, the important counterconduct of migrants
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themselves. These relationships “extend beyond the
boundaries of specific places” (Elwood, Lawson, and
Sheppard 2017, 749) and occur both as dense mate-
rial and discursive configurations situated in specific
places as well as connected logics, strategies, and
practices that are unevenly, yet expansively, distrib-
uted throughout space and time.
Thailand Case: Destitution through
Categorization and Encampment
For more than thirty years, Thailand has hosted
around 150,000 Burmese refugees and asylum seekers
in camps along the border between Myanmar and
Thailand. Whereas NGOs and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) catego-
rize these migrants as asylum seekers and refugees,
with important consequences for humanitarian aid
and resettlement possibilities, they are not recog-
nized as such by Thailand. Thailand is not a signa-
tory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and refers to
them as “displaced persons from Myanmar” and the
camps as “temporary shelters.” Thailand has permit-
ted NGOs to (at times) make refugee status determi-
nations, operate the camps, provide humanitarian
aid, and conduct development interventions and at
times has permitted camp residents to move freely
around the surrounding area, although now the
camps are closed. Some NGOs serve migrants gener-
ally and some actively register and recognize refugee
status under the Convention. How and when people
become displaced people, refugees, and asylum
seekers has varied, with consequences for migrants’
livelihoods. In practice, migrants have needed to
subsidize their diminishing levels of subsistence sup-
port from NGOs with work outside the camps, even
though movement generates opportunities for exploi-
tation from police and some nearby residents.
Changing official status determinations of refugee
and asylum seeker have affected residents of the
camps. The UNHCR had made refugee status deter-
minations for people in the camps until 2005. That
year, the Thai government assumed responsibility for
new migrants—yet has made no new status determi-
nations since that time, despite the continued arrival
of migrants from Myanmar. Shifting duties from
NGOs to the Thai government led to the growth of
an unrecognized refugee or asylum seeker population
in the camp, who were ineligible for formal refugee
resettlement. UNHCR-designated refugees continued
to be resettled until 2014, when the UNHCR
stopped resettling people from the camps and, simul-
taneously, the Thai government announced plans to
begin repatriating camp residents to Myanmar. The
UNHCR has declared Myanmar safe for repatriation,
but advocates note that most residents of the camps
are reluctant to leave. Since 2010, when the
Myanmar military government transitioned to civil-
ian rule, Myanmar has been seen as increasingly
open for economic development. As Norum,
Mostafanezhad, and Sebro (2016) wrote, the change
in governance has been accompanied by a move in
international development and humanitarian assis-
tance funding from the border areas to inside
Myanmar. In 2015, advocates from different migrant
support organizations within Thailand mentioned
that the government’s interest in the potential for
economic development in the border region was as a
means of “solving” the persistent problem of camp
residents precluded from resettlement and unwilling
to repatriate. Officials were interested in taking
advantage of the “captive labor force” of the
Burmese migrant population within the camps
through the construction of special economic zones
to employ residents of the camps. This idea, accord-
ing to an advocate, would not only solve the prob-
lem of long-term camp residents but also serve as a
barrier to new labor migrants from Myanmar by pro-
viding the incentive of increased Thai wages without
requiring migrants to cross the border. According to
a representative of a migrant NGO interviewed in
2015, “A special economic zone along the land bor-
der has been the subject of a number of talks …
the Thai private sector and the international com-
munity want to transition refugees to labor migrants.
[Refugees] are seen by companies as being bet-
ter qualified.”
In 2015, Thailand established the first of its ten
planned special economic zones (SEZs). The SEZ in
Tak Province, along the Myanmar border, incorpo-
rates Mae Sot, an area of cross-border flows of goods,
laborers, and forced migrants for the past several
decades. Nearby is the largest of the Thai border ref-
ugee camps, Mae La, which houses more than
37,000 mostly Karen refugees from Myanmar. A
2016 study by the GMS Secretariat describes the
location of the SEZ as being reliant on a labor sup-
ply that “comprises migrant day-workers from
Myanmar and nearby Burmese refugee camps” (GMS
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Secretariat 2016, 14). The SEZ is dominated by
Thai firms seeking low-wage employees: Small
domestic firms rely on domestic workers, and the
larger firms “overwhelmingly employ foreign labor,”
including residents of the camps (GMS Secretariat
2016, 20). What the Thai government had envi-
sioned as the promise of the captive labor market of
the refugee camps in 2015 has begun to become a
reality in the Mae Sot region.
What made this vision of Mae La’s refugees as a
captive labor force for low-wage Thai firms possible?
The circuits of value production that result in the
creation of a cheap, dependent labor force begin
with techniques of categorization—particularly, in
this case, the gap in categorization between the refu-
gees for whom permanent and group resettlement
was a possibility and the asylum seekers and nonrec-
ognized individuals who now make up most of Mae
La’s camp population. Changing processes of classifi-
cation reveal the politics of bounding within status
determinations and how the category of refugee is
constantly transformed and reinterpreted “in
response to shifts in political alliances or interests on
the part of refugee-receiving countries and the evo-
lution of policy and law” (Crawley and Skleparis
2018, 4). As governments increasingly replace
NGOs in authoring new categories of migrants, the
label of refugee becomes increasingly fractioned to
detach migrants from claims to international protec-
tion (Zetter 2007). In this case, the Thai govern-
ment’s decision in 2005 to take over refugee
registration and the deliberate decision not to pro-
cess newly arrived migrants’ claims meant that many
migrants were left without access to resettlement,
humanitarian aid, or even temporary protection; in
short, their destitution was produced.
This case study highlights the important role of
legal malleability in the constitution of destitution
economies: The categorization of people by the
“discretionary state” (Coutin et al. 2017) exacerbates
their destitution within the camps, as studies linking
sociolegal status and precarity have similarly shown
(Lewis et al. 2015; Burridge and Gill 2017). Scholars
such as Ong (2006) have noted that similar strate-
gies of “graduated sovereignty” and precarious citi-
zenship constrain the rights of populations within
other SEZs in Asia. Here, however, we see that legal
malleability, and particularly the selective use of
legal status categories, is central to the production of
destitution economies. In this case, the deliberate
use of ambiguous, selective, or malleable status pro-
duces potential value, specifically embodied as flexi-
ble, underpaid, legally precarious migrant labor.
Thus, the SEZ’s location and labor force are made
possible through the deliberate use of gaps between
recognized refugees and unrecognized asylum seekers
or migrants (Coddington 2018).
The captive labor force was also constructed
through the encampment of refugees. Without the
long-term tactics of control over refugee mobility,
they would not have been available for Thai low-
wage firms. Olivius (2017) noted that encampment
allows for the spatial control of refugees, efficient
delivery of services, and the isolation of refugees
from the host society, especially important in the
case of the Thai border camps. Although scholars
contest the notion of refugee camps as complete
spaces of exception (Ramadan 2013), here camp res-
idents’ ambiguous legal status renders them distinctly
available to exploitation (e.g., by the Thai police,
who extort refugees attempting to enter and leave
the camps) or development interventions (Turner
2016; Olivius 2017). Mountz (2015) drew similar
conclusions about the ambiguous legal status of
migrants sequestered offshore in Nauru and Guam.
According to Turner (2016), this ambiguity stems
from a fundamental contradiction in terms: Camp
residents are forbidden to settle, because they are
supposed to be on the move, yet camp residents can-
not remain on the move because they have nowhere
to go.
Encampment required that migrants develop local
options for subsistence, yet it also facilitated the
creation of a community that prefers to remain in
place rather than repatriate. As Vaddhanaphuti
(2016) noted, the younger generations of refugees
born in the camps do not imagine Myanmar as
“home”: “they are not willing to ‘return’ to
Myanmar as they have no ties with it and share a
different worldview” (3). Encampment of refugees,
in this case, highlights another aspect of destitu-
tion economies: the constitution of surplus popula-
tions. Gilmore (2007) pointed to the California
prison system as an example of recurring geograph-
ical attempts to stabilize the problem of surplus
unemployed workers in urban centers and rural
peripheries, and destitution economies operate
through similar spatial and temporal configurations
that recast extreme dispossession as underutilized
labor. The destitution economy of Thailand’s
Destitution Economies 9
border SEZ connects migrants’ legal malleability,
encampment, and refusal to return and the man-
agement of surplus populations, making migrants’
sociopolitical exclusion a resource rather than a
burden. Reframing the camp as a potential source
of low-paid workers, this case highlights an under-
lying logic driving destitution economies more
generally. Value is envisioned not as something to
be extracted primarily in the present moment; pri-
vate investment requires valuation of encamped
migrants in speculative, anticipatory terms, as
potential labor. In the Thai case, the value of
camp residents for the SEZ is primarily understood
as a future capacity for value—a speculative imagi-
nary that Tadiar (2013) described as “an anticipa-
tory time of realization of value in excess of the
present value for which it is exchanged” (22).
Surplus camp residents, therefore, become envi-
sioned as future currency, a “captive labor force”
that generates value for the manufacturers and
investors along the border but also solves the prob-
lems of refugees prohibited from resettling or
repatriating.
United States Case: Care, Control, and
Accumulating Dispossessions
Religious icons, personal photographs, plastic bot-
tles, footwear, jackets, and other utterly ordinary
everyday things; feminist geographer Sundberg
(2013) presented a vivid picture of items left behind
in the deserts of southwestern Arizona along the
Mexico–U.S. border. Sundberg’s account offers a
glimpse into the character and significance of the
possessions that many migrants must give up—or
that they are stripped of—as they travel northward
en route into the United States. In this case study,
we detail some of the ways in which migrants produce
value in the dispossession of their belongings. Here,
circuits of value connect the deprivation of migrants’
things, money, and identity documents with value
produced through their unpaid or underpaid labor.
Immigration detention in the United States has
expanded significantly over the past twenty-five
years, and even more sharply since the Trump
administration took office. In 1994 the average daily
population of detained migrants was 6,785. In 2014
that figure was 33,200 (Ryo and Peacock 2018); in
2018 more than 45,000 people were detained per
day (Human Rights First 2019), and the budget
request for 2019 proposed a quota of 52,000
(Benenson 2018; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security 2018). These substantial increases reflect
legislation (and Executive Orders) that, since the
mid-1990s, have worked to criminalize an expanding
swath of categories of migrants. Among other things,
changes in the juridico-political landscape intro-
duced and expanded a category of crime labeled
aggravated felony under immigration law to include
more than thirty types of offenses. The criminaliza-
tion of minor immigration offenses has led immigra-
tion judges to remark that numerous “non-violent,
fairly trivial misdemeanors are considered aggravated
felonies under our immigration laws” (Marks and
Slavin 2012, 92). Detention is mandatory for
migrants convicted of an aggravated felony, and
these changes have therefore expanded the catego-
ries of detainable migrants (Martin 2015).
Even more recently, and ever more explicitly, the
Trump regime’s stance on immigration potentially
makes migration itself a criminal act. The current
administration’s recent xenophobic, racist efforts to
criminalize immigration and migrants include a zero-
tolerance policy that separated migrant children
from family members on arrival at the U.S. border,
announcement of a “denaturalization initiative”
(Wasem 2018) aimed at retroactively revoking natu-
ralized citizenship for migrants who have had even
minor irregularities2 on their citizenship application,
and planned redefinition and expansion of public
charge rules for immigrants that effectively deny citi-
zenship eligibility for immigrants who have received
government assistance such as food stamps and pub-
lic housing support (Wheeler and Schreiber 2019).
For criminalized migrants, detention and deportation
are ever-present threats. These developments thus
reduce migrants to destitute subjects who are yoked
to, and by, a system of care and control. Moreover,
dispossessing destitute migrants of their things is part
of a carceral circuit of value that extracts labor and
accumulates capital.
Like the desert trails that Sundberg described,
detention facility handbooks provide insight into the
ways in which detained migrants are further dispos-
sessed. Handbooks can, we argue, be understood as
part of the biopolitics that produces irregular
migrants as destitute and simultaneously as subjects
with value. Facility handbooks we have reviewed
state that individuals must swap their “civilian”
clothes for a prison jumpsuit and relinquish all items
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and money in their possession; the only personal
item permitted is a wedding band. In this process,
detained migrants are stripped not only of their
material possessions but also of their identity, with
expressions of individuality or affiliation vetoed or
subject to disciplinary control. Part of U.S. deten-
tion’s unstated punitive function, removing people’s
possessions produces their subsequent dependence on
commissaries for small comforts and family members
or low-paid work for money.
Under these conditions—confined in remote facili-
ties, with limited access to support networks or cash,
and housed in detention for an indefinite period of
time—detained migrants become valuable as a com-
modified labor supply in the day-to-day operation of
detention facilities. In previous research on subcon-
tracts and the infrastructure and operation of immi-
gration detention, we identified a cycle of privation
and dispossession, need and demand, coerced labor,
and commodification of immigrant detainees (Conlon
and Hiemstra 2014, 2017a). For example, until
recently, subcontracts for detention facility telecom-
munications services have included substantial com-
mission rates that are passed on to detainees. This
greatly restricts migrant detainees’ ability to maintain
regular contact with friends and family members out-
side detention. In 2013, for instance, detainees
housed in New Jersey facilities paid almost $15.00 for
a fifteen-minute phone call to the local New York
area; in contrast, the same call from a landline or cell
phone outside detention would cost $2.00 or less (see
Conlon and Hiemstra 2014). Because they are limited
to a small number of possessions, and this includes
cash or credit in their accounts, migrant detainees
often rely on others—family, friends, or volunteers—
to purchase phone cards. Alternatively, they can par-
ticipate in “voluntary” work programs for which they
are paid $1.00 per day. Through these microcircuits
of value, we can see how detention conditions pro-
duce impoverishment and deprivation, which, in
turn, becomes a means for extracting labor and profit
from migrant detainees.
Migrants are also dispossessed when their posses-
sions are removed or lost as they move through the
U.S. detention and deportation system, a literal
manifestation of the sociolegal categories producing
destitution. For instance, Martinez and Slack (2013)
reported that over half of individuals detained for
more than one week stated that some of their
belongings went unaccounted for and were not
returned to them; extrapolating from this study,
Encinas (2017) noted, if the sample in their research
is representative, that would mean of 1.5 million
deportations between 2009 and 2012, approximately
one third, or “more than 540,000 migrants … did
not have personal possessions returned to them.”
There are specific spaces and situations within the
detention and deportation system where disposses-
sions of this kind are more likely to occur. Being
processed en masse, as is the case under Operation
Streamline, a type of fast-track removal of irregular
immigrants along the southwest U.S.–Mexico border,
is one such situation. Martinez and Slack (2013)
reported that of those who were deported in
Operation Streamline proceedings, 57 percent indi-
cated having “a possession taken and not returned”
(3). Being transferred between detention facilities or
immigration agencies or actors is another situation
that increases the likelihood of being dispossessed,
with studies indicating that at least half of migrants
in U.S. detention are detained at least once (Ryo
and Peacock 2018). In recent years, the logic driving
transfers has been to fill detention quotas and to
avail of bed space in underutilized detention facilities,
where contractors including state and local govern-
ments as well as private contractors vie for the federal
dollars that Immigration and Customs Enforcement
pays to detain (see Hiemstra 2013; Martin 2015).
The consequences of dispossession for migrants
who are deported are severe. Martinez and Slack
(2013) described the loss of clothing, money, cell
phones, and identity documents for migrants
deported to Mexico, dispossessions that push
migrants further into impoverishment and depen-
dency on others. Migrants become “more vulnerable
to extortion via unscrupulous entrepreneurs … or to
trafficking or smuggling operations” (Martinez and
Slack 2013, 8). In short, dispossession at deportation
makes migrants dependent and desperate and pushes
them deeper toward clandestine destitution econo-
mies where the cycle of value, extraction, disposabil-
ity, and further dispossession begins again.3
Here, we see economies of dispossession within
the U.S. detention and deportation system that
deprive migrants of their belongings, money, and
identity documents and that push migrants into new
forms of value creation through their unpaid or
underpaid labor. In this case, migrants become valu-
able as both laborers and consumers in the cycle of
dispossession, deprivation, and underpaid “voluntary”
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work. As in the other case studies, migrants’ sociole-
gal status is fundamental to these circuits of value,
as are spatial practices of forced mobility (transfers,
deportation) and enclosure (detention). Indeed, as
in the case studies presented here, the U.S. deten-
tion system’s specific destitution economy exists pre-
cisely because migrants are detainable and
deportable, and their sociolegal status generates new
opportunities for the production of value. Value
emerges through profits on commissary sales, under-
paid migrant labor, and the possible future value of
migrants’ forced mobility. Unlike the encampment
or immobility of Burmese refugees in Thailand,
detained migrants in the United States face dispos-
session in their forced mobility into detention,
between centers, and in deportation. Through the
frequent movement of migrants within the detention
and deportation system, value is produced—not sim-
ply profits in the form of privatized bed spaces but
also the anticipation of future value in the form of
susceptibility to extortion, trafficking, or new forms
of dependency. Here, it is migrants’ carceral mobili-
ties through this system that make them valuable in
their destitution. Across our case studies, shifting
categorizations enable states to strategically im/mobi-
lize migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, enforcing
their destitution and, in turn, making them valuable
as needy subjects.
United Kingdom Case: Destitution as
Deterrence to Asylum Seekers
In this section, we discuss how destitution is both
produced and productive, creating circuits of value
that depend on the entrenchment of poverty for asy-
lum seekers in the United Kingdom. Although desti-
tution is not a legally codified term in most places, it
is an important legal category in UK asylum law,
and it is within literature on UK asylum seekers that
we find the majority of work exploring the condi-
tions of how life is experienced for those who are
destitute. Indeed, the category of destitute asylum
seeker is a recognized social–legal category used by
government, welfare, and support sectors. Under the
United Kingdom’s 1999 Immigration Act, Section
95(3), destitution is described as follows:
A person is destitute if (a) he does not have adequate
accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether
or not his essential living needs are met); or (b) he has
adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it,
but cannot meet his other essential living needs.
(Cited in Bloom 2015, 80)
Destitute refused asylum seekers (including those
with cases pending on appeal) can access particular
forms of state support, including “no-choice” hous-
ing, where asylum seekers are dispersed across the
country in basic accommodation without regard to
family or individual preference and provided below-
poverty-line subsistence benefits. As Cuthill (2017)
noted, the more than 285,000 destitute asylum
seekers living without recourse to public funds end
up homeless, subject to ill health, and vulnerable to
exploitation. Scholars have linked the United
Kingdom’s “state-enforced destitution” (Waite and
Lewis 2017, 969) with increasingly restrictive welfare
policies but stress that targeting asylum seekers intro-
duces an exclusionary bordering logic into wider
projects of governance of the poor (Guentner
et al. 2016).
Recent UK asylum policy has focused on deterring
asylum seekers from traveling to the United
Kingdom to claim asylum and to increasing the cost
of making those claims. Part of a broader effort to
create a “hostile environment” for migrants in the
United Kingdom, administrative changes to the asy-
lum process have included the privatization of asy-
lum seeker accommodation (Darling 2014, 2016),
eliminating free legal aid (Burridge and Gill 2017),
and raising fees for appealing negative asylum
decisions. For refused asylum seekers, Home Office
policies of detention, mandatory reporting, and
reduction or removal of benefits seek to incentivize
refused asylum seekers’ voluntary departure by, quite
simply, making daily life unlivable. In addition, these
policies now rely heavily on private-sector firms, so
that the implementation provides a source of
private-sector revenue for housing and support
services where councils were once key actors in
the asylum field (see Darling 2016). This mingling
of private and public involvement allows private
companies to accumulate profit through the dispos-
session of migrant labor and resources (Conlon and
Hiemstra 2014, 2017). Financial and housing sup-
ports for destitute asylum seekers are so low that
there is no opportunity to move out of destitution.
Neither asylum seekers nor refused asylum seekers
are allowed to formally work, adding to difficulties
sustaining themselves independently.
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Concerns about the United Kingdom’s “pull
factors”—easy access to health care, work, and
benefits—have provoked policies aimed at limiting
access to these entitlements and the quality of life
they produce. Labor migrants cannot access public
funds of any sort, whereas asylum seekers may access
them at reduced rates to UK residents. Asylum
seekers applying for support must first prove that
they have no savings, assets, or family on whom
they can rely. Following this evaluation, asylum
seekers are allocated housing in a location decided
by contractors; this no-choice housing system is now
entirely privatized and relies heavily on low-cost
housing in deindustrialized areas like Manchester,
Glasgow, and the northeast of England (Darling
2016). The privatization of asylum hosting follows
the privatization of the detention estate (Gill 2009),
as well as welfare services in the United Kingdom in
general. In the case of housing, however, this privat-
ization relies on the devaluation of former working-
class housing in certain areas of the United
Kingdom and the United Kingdom’s obligations
under European Union asylum law to provide for
destitute asylum seekers. In other words, this particu-
lar assemblage of infrastructure requires international
and national legal mechanisms on asylum and public
and private contracting. In categorizing people, asy-
lum and immigration laws render asylum seekers des-
titute even as the privatization of state services has
linked, in this case, transnational security and “life
services” companies like G4S and Sodexo to them.
The emergence of these kinds of contractors has
relied on the restructuring of state economies world-
wide; both are global firms providing a wide range of
security, custody, accommodation, cleaning, and
catering services formerly provided by public institu-
tions. Although immigration and asylum might not
be exceptional as increasingly privatized state func-
tions, they do operate through legal regimes that, in
this case, seek to make everyday life undesirable up to
the point of unlivability. Here value emerges not
through the provision of care and comfort but from
withholding them.
In addition to relocation to no-choice housing out-
side of London, destitute asylum seekers may access
monetary support, as well. A debit card system, the
ASPEN card, has recently replaced vouchers for asy-
lum seekers, allowing them to withdraw cash at regular
ATMs, whereas refused asylum seekers have been
issued cashless debit cards since 2009. Asylum seekers
can apply for destitution relief through different provi-
sions in UK asylum law before and after a decision is
made on their case: Section 95 provides £37.75 per
person per week for open cases and Section 4 provides
£35.39 per person per week to refused asylum seekers
who cannot return to their country of origin. Both
groups are given funds on an ASPEN card, managed
by Financial Services, Ltd., a company specializing in
point-of-sale systems and transaction data manage-
ment. From 2009 to 2017, refused asylum seekers were
limited to approved retailers, which greatly restricted
what people could purchase—even creating issues with
subsistence—and where people could shop. Shame and
harassment accompanied use of the card, and asylum
seekers experienced racist or discriminatory behaviors
(Coddington 2019). Like the Azure Card before it, the
ASPEN card produces data about what and where
people purchase goods. Purchasing data might be valu-
able for immigration enforcement: Asylum seeker sup-
port organizations have reported instances of the UK
Home Office using transaction patterns and data to
cut or curtail financial support, but the criteria for
evaluating these data have never been shared (Carnet,
Blanchard, and Ellis 2014; Unity Centre Glasgow
2017). Nevertheless, the provision of destitution sup-
port has itself become a mechanism of surveillance,
highlighting the important role of specific technologies
in producing particular destitution economies. Here,
asylum seekers’ everyday mobilities are registered in
purchases, and these data are circulated between finan-
cial services firms and the Home Office.
Destitution-as-deterrence in the United Kingdom
has unfolded through the privatization of services
previously offered by council governments and non-
profit organizations and through an increasingly hos-
tile Home Office. Not only is the category of
destitution productive but asylum seekers’ reproduc-
tive labor is required for both the production of
transaction data and the reproduction of destitution
as a domain of service provision. It is important to
note that although we can trace economic relation-
ships between people and organizations, destitution-
as-deterrence is more than the reduction of eco-
nomic choices. Deterrence is meant to be a shared
affect, resulting from a generalized impression of dis-
comfort, lack of opportunity, and probable punish-
ment. The circulation of discomfort acts as an
affective economy, circulating “in an economic
sense, working to differentiate some others from
other others, a differentiation that is never ‘over,’ as
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it waits for others who have not yet arrived”
(Ahmed 2004, 123; also see Hage 2003). It is there-
fore critical to attend to the affective economies
that deterrence policies presume, in addition to the
material infrastructures, contracting relationships,
and financial networks.
Here, new finance–security assemblages (de
Goede 2012) do not improve quality of life or
improve efficiencies but do the opposite: They weap-
onize the degradation of services, frustration with
glitchy technologies, and bureaucratic opacity. In
the UK case, value is produced through the possible
surveillance and financial profiling capacities of
migrants’ debit card use but also through the less
tangible but desired quality of making life more diffi-
cult for migrants. Migrant purchases are valuable for
the information they provide, but their discomfort
illustrates the value of deterrence within wider affec-
tive economies. The legal categories and procedures
of asylum produce unwaged populations dependent
on basic care, so that legal apparatuses form a criti-
cal part of destitution economies’ circuitries. In this
case, banal contracting and procurement procedures
link broader, international circuits of value to asylum
regimes. Destitution-as-deterrence, in particular,
emphasizes the reproductive and domestic not only
as spaces of monitoring but as sources of labor; it is
migrants’ everyday labor, such as grocery shopping,
that produces transactional data and inhabits homes.
The financial services company collects and analyzes
those data, valorizing the expertise necessary to
make sense of the data and share it with the Home
Office. As in both previous cases, categorization as
excludable enables enforced destitution for refused
asylum seekers, and the mechanisms of state support
in turn render everyday life as valuable data. Again,
the movement of migrants through their everyday
routines is a critical part of the production of value:
Their “liquidity” as unemployable, dependent, and
impoverished subjects makes them valuable as sub-
jects of immigration control.
Discussion: Conceptualizing
Destitution Economies
Our three case studies describe different destitu-
tion economies, each reliant on legal categorization
of migrants, spatial practices of mobility control
(encampment, detention, no-choice housing), and
deprivation. Each case study shows how context-
specific mechanisms produce destitution economies:
SEZs, detention conditions, including work pro-
grams, transaction data analysis, and sharing.
Although specific practices differ, the legal othering
of migrants creates the conditions for their destitu-
tion—a material and discursive configuration of
extreme impoverishment and dependency—and
underscores how that destitution becomes valuable
for others and, through private-sector investment in
all three cases, embedded within broader circuits of
value. Although destitution economies are bound up
with for-profit forms of carceral control, we argue
that destitution economies are driven by more than
profit. The Thai example is grounded in the flexible
categorization of migrants and their reorientation as
possible surplus labor. The U.S. example, mean-
while, is based on the ratcheting up of migrant desti-
tution within the detention system and cycles of
dispossession, deprivation, and underpaid work.
Dispossession upon dispossession accumulates as
migrants move—and are made to move—through
the U.S. detention and deportation system. In the
United Kingdom, migrants’ everyday labor produces
destitution-as-deterrence, which generates value for
the UK border enforcement regime both through
material economic relationships and the long-term
affectual drain on migrants’ lives.
In each case study, destitution economies are built
on a foundation of insecure legal status. Although
impoverished migrants share some of the same gruel-
ing daily challenges as other destitute populations,
their legal status matters. Migrants in Thailand face
the challenge of feeding their families through low-
wage exploitative factory jobs, but having to sneak
out of closed refugee camps on a daily basis adds new
levels of vulnerability and risk. Migrant detainees in
the United States, like their counterparts in prison,
face the injustice of forced labor within the U.S. car-
ceral system, and frequent transfers, indefinite deten-
tion, and probable eventual deportation lead to lost
possessions and further impoverishment. Meanwhile,
in the United Kingdom, debit card holders face
restrictions similar to other welfare benefits recipients,
yet their possible deportation increases the impacts of
any failure to comply. The malleability of migrants’
categorizations is integral to their deprivation, as well
as to the kinds of value they produce.
Across these destitution economies, migrants’
encampment, dispossession, and im/mobility make
them valuable to others in their need, surplus labor,
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and desire to stay in place. Although privatization
and profit can be key rationalities for assigning value
to migrants within destitution economies, these
arrangements also reinterpret destitute migrants as
commensurate with forms of economic value. It is
through their uncertain status, dependence, and
extreme impoverishments that migrants become
translated as differently valuable, as a form of surplus
that can be capitalized on. In short, destitute migrants
translate and commensurate between different valua-
tion mechanisms. In our case studies, migrants
become a bit like “cash,” as Tadiar (2016) wrote,
“which means their immediate convertibility into any
number of things and actions in order to serve as so
many kinds of relays, intersections, components, and
channels for the value-producing movements of oth-
ers” (75). Destitution economies are grounded in the
circulation and exchange of migrants as surplus: They
must leave the Thai camps, be repeatedly transferred
and incrementally dispossessed in the U.S. detention
system, and continually shop and produce transac-
tional data to generate value within the United
Kingdom’s destitution-as-deterrence process. Circuits
of value are not simply moments of exchange or
transactions but the movement between orders of
value; that is, one crucial way to make migrants valu-
able is to keep them on the move.
Although each economic relationship opens ave-
nues for value to be produced in the form of profit,
value is not only extractable in the present in each
example. Through the sense of future capitalizing on
surplus labor on the Thai–Myanmar border, the
potential ongoing economic ties to be developed
between public enforcement agencies and private
actors that encompass detention operations in the
United States, and migrant-generated purchasing
data in the United Kingdom, value is seen as antici-
patory. The potential value of migrants generated
through their temporary, uncertain, or vulnerable
legal status reveals a “prospecting logic at work”
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2017, 199) within destitution
economies, creating space for speculative financiali-
zation practices to become entrenched within
enforcement and migrant governance.
Conclusion
Our conceptualization of destitution economies
reframes rationalities of border enforcement and
thereby opens up new questions for geographical
research on political geographies of migration, eco-
nomic geographies of bordering, and legal geogra-
phies of exclusion. Whereas concrete mapping of
industry-level, for-profit contractors within the
immigration industrial complex has ushered in a
range of important geographical work underscoring
the incentive to profit from border enforcement, our
attention to destitution economies points to the
connectedness of speculation, dispossession, impover-
ishment, and surveillance technologies. Our case
studies show how destitution economies of migration
control mobilize speculative, anticipatory forms of
value, thereby incorporating spatial practices of
encampment, forced im/mobilities, and incentiviza-
tion of return alongside material profits from privati-
zation and, as we have shown, substantively inform
why and how border enforcement is changing.
Beyond rethinking migration governance, our
conceptualization of destitution economies of migra-
tion control contributes to broader rethinking of
how economies are made to work. As de Goede
(2005) wrote, economies are performative: “processes
of knowledge and interpretation do not exist in
addition to, or of secondary importance to, ‘real’
material financial structures but are precisely the way
in which finance materializes” (5–7). In destitution
economies, the legal categorizations, migration and
refugee statistics, and politicization of transboundary
mobility create the material conditions of destitution
in which migrants are expected to merely live. The
shared affects constructed through destitution econo-
mies—the risk of everyday mobility in Thailand, the
criminalization constructed through aggravated felo-
nies and mandatory prison uniforms in the United
States, or the discomfort and hostility produced
through cashless debit cards in the United
Kingdom—are coconstituted with the circuits of
exchange described in our case studies. In particular,
destitution economies of migration control rely on
migrants’ staying alive. Destitution is precisely the
state of living without thriving, existing without
resources to move on or settle permanently.
Migrants’ value emerges, then, from remaining on
the move and everyday reproductive capacities. The
restrictive border regimes and ethnonationalist fears
that justify migrants’ and refugees’ exclusion from
the privileges of paid work make them valuable in
their decapacification.
In asking how destitute migrants and refugees
become valuable for others, our argument speaks to
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both political movements and contemporary migra-
tion control research. The interpellation of migrants
as value-bearing subjects embeds economic relation-
ships in ways that impede migrant and refugee rights
movements, and it is critical that methodologies and
knowledge production move beyond the limitations
of rights-based advocacy and provide fresh counter-
narratives. In the United States, boycotts are already
underway against Wayfair, Amazon, and a number of
banks, drawing attention to financial connections
and infrastructures of complicity in migrant exclu-
sion. Finally, destitution economies of migration
control demand deeper integration of recent work in
political and economic geography. Articulating
migration and border control as a problem of politics
has limited geographers’ appreciation of the ways in
which forms of value production are coming into
being through the mobility of surplus populations.
Approaching questions of privatization of public
services, migrant detention, or the marketization of
migrants as labor as unreconstructed capitalist logics
obscures the practices of law, state power, and forced
mobility that change the nodes composing circuits of
value, as well as the sociotechnical practices of cir-
culation that drive processes of value production. In
particular, we call for more geographical research
working across the politics of marketization, critical
logistics of state violence, and the racialization of
urban (under)development, migration, and impover-
ishment. Destitution, as we have argued, is critical
to political practices of bordering and exclusion—
and these practices cannot be understood without
the economic rationale of exploitation and depen-
dency that drive them.
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Notes
1. Please see the Method section for a description of
how we use the terms migrants, refugees, and
asylum seekers.
2. Irregularities include prior removal orders, which
some asylum seekers might have prior to a defensive
asylum application.
3. In an attempt to bring greater transparency to the
system, national standards on Transport, Escort,
Detention, and Search (TEDS) were introduced in
2015. This policy lays out procedures for handling
detainee belongings while “immigration-enforcement
agents [are] entrusted with their care” (Ewing and
Cantor 2016, 1). To date, the policy has had no
effect, however, according to Ewing and Cantor’s
research. The reported rate of items missing in 2015,
before TEDS was implemented, was 41.5 percent and
in 2016, after TEDS was introduced, the rate was 41
percent. What the policy achieves is new layers of
accounting and bureaucracy but not greater
accountability.
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